Massoud Toossi Saeidi; Seyed Hassan Hosseini
Abstract
In this paper, first Physicalism is defined by the suggestion of David Lewis, and through the use of the concept of Supervenience. Afterwards, it is explained that among a variety of ...
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In this paper, first Physicalism is defined by the suggestion of David Lewis, and through the use of the concept of Supervenience. Afterwards, it is explained that among a variety of Emergentist's positions, a small number can be chosen to have an ontological inconsistency with Physicalism. In this regard, the Substantial Emergentism, based on the thoughts of Hasker, Lowe and Toner, and the Causal Emergentism, based on O'Connor and Wong's ideas, and their incompatibility with physicalism is explained. In the following, the relation of each of these ideas, with each other and with Physicalism and Cartesian Dualism, is analyzed. In the end, based on a metaphysical analysis, a new Emergentist's position is proposed; which its ontology is not a basically different plan from Physicalism, but at the same time inconsistent with it. It is also explained that the non-differentiation of this proposal with physicalism in terms of its ontological outline is its advantage over the emergentist's positions which are examined in this paper.
